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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of the market convention for quoting CMBX spreads on the
CMBX-Cash basis. Using the CMBX Series 5 spreads between 22 May 2008 and 15 July 2009,
we compute the value of the upfront payment for each trade date based on the market’s assumed
notional schedule of the underlying CMBS. From this upfront payment, we calculate the implied
deal spread under alternate notional schedules of the underlying CMBS and recalculate the basis.
We find that for most trade dates in our sample, the market deal spread trades far wider than is
implied under a scenario of severe defaults in the underlying. The degree of distortion on spreads is
amplified as the level of subordination and credit quality declines. The technical factors underlying
CMBX trading dominate movements in spreads to such a degree that the level of default risk in
the constituent CMBS is obscured. These distortions impair the CMBX-Cash basis as an indicator
of relative value between the synthetic and cash markets.
Keywords: CMBX; CMBS; Credit Default Swap Basis
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the effect of the market convention for quoting spreads implied by CMBX
prices on the CMBX-Cash basis.1As shown in Figure 1, in the first year of CMBX trading, the
spread differential between the CMBX and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) indices
of the same credit quality remained near zero. Beginning March 2007, the differential between
BBB and BBB- CMBX and CMBS spreads began to diverge—pushing the differential to a positive
level until March 2008, when the differential turned highly negative and volatile, reaching a low of
approximately -600 bps in November 2008. Since the CMBX was devised as an instrument to allow
investors to synthetically assume or hedge credit exposure to underlying CMBS, the significant gap
between the cash and synthetic spreads is puzzling.
We contend that the market convention used to map the value of the CMBX contract to
its quoted spread implies an unreasonable notional schedule that has distorted both the CMBX
spread and CMBX-Cash basis. The timing and speed of losses under this implied notional schedule
is inconsistent with reasonable loss expectations for the various tranches in the underlying CMBS,
which pushes the quoted CMBX spread wider. We demonstrate this by using the market value of
the CMBX contract for each trading day in our sample and recompute the CMBX spread under
three alternate default scenarios for the constituent CMBS that comprise the index. We then
compare these recomputed spreads to their respective traded market spread and recompute the
basis.
We find that for most trade dates in our sample the trading mechanics of the CMBX have
pushed spreads to levels higher than would be implied assuming severe losses in the underlying loan
pool, particularly so in the subordinate tranches. Exceptions to this relationship occur for trade
dates earlier in the sample (prior to November 2008) and for lower-rated indices. The relationship
between the traded and alternate spread is driven by assumptions in the timing, speed and total
expected losses, in addition to other risks such as prepayment and extension.
Spreads for indices with the most credit enhancement (AAA and AJ) should be relatively
insensitive to term default risk in the constituent CMBS, but the impact of extension risk on the
spread should be considered. The spreads for the remaining indices with lower subordination are
more sensitive to term default risk, as changes in the assumed notional trajectory of the underlying
1 Prior to April 20, 2009, the CMBX traded on spread. During this period, the upfront payment and price of the
contract were implied from the spread. Since April 20, 2009, the CMBX quoting convention has reversed to trade
on price. CMBX spreads are now implied from the price of the contract.
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loans produce significantly different implied spreads. Lastly, the implied spreads under the market
trading convention for CMBX are highly sensitive to changes in interest rates. All together, these
findings suggest that the CMBX-Cash basis is not a clear indicator of relative value between the
synthetic and cash market. The basis should be interpreted with caution and further consideration
given to extension risk and the timing of losses in the underlying loans.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the meaning of the basis and explores
potential explanations for its existence. Section 3 outlines the data and methodology used to
calculate alternative CMBX spreads. Section 4 provides a discussion of our results, while Section
5 concludes. We provide a background discussion of the origin of the CMBX market, trading
mechanics and settlement in the appendices.
2 The Basis
Throughout this paper we refer to “the basis” as an indication of some mispricing between the
synthetic and cash market. However within the broader financial economics literature, the basis
is a term often used to describe a wide range of distinct pricing relationships.2 Our usage of
“the basis” refers to the CDS-Cash basis, which relates the spread on CDS to the spread on the
underlying cash bond of the same reference entity. More specifically, our study examines the spread
on CMBX indices to constituent CMBS spreads. An obvious question that may arise is why we
compare an index of CDS spreads (the CMBX spreads) to the CMBS spreads rather than the
CDS spreads of the individual constituents. Due to thin trading in single-name CMBS CDS, CDS
spreads for CMBX constituents are difficult to acquire. This contrasts with the corporate market,
where trading in single-name CDS is higher and spreads are easily available.
2.1 The CMBX-Cash Basis
To assess the relationship between the synthetic and cash credit markets, we will use the observed
CMBX-Cash basis as an example to ground our discussion. Figure 1 presents the CMBX basis for
three ratings categories: AAA, BBB, and BBB-. The synthetic side of the basis is the spread for the
on-the-run CMBX series, while the cash side of the basis is an index of CMBS spreads. However,
although the CMBX provides credit exposure to a basket of 25 names, it is common practice in the
market to compare the index to one single-name cash spread. This single-name cash spread may or
2 For example, the deviation between the spot and futures price of commodities is referred to as the basis.
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Figure 1: CMBX-Cash Basis
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Figure 2: AAA CMBX-GG10 Basis
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
-800
-700
-600
-500
22-May-08 22-Jul-08 22-Sep-08 22-Nov-08 22-Jan-09 22-Mar-09 22-May-09
Source: CMBX Series 5 spread from Barclays Capital; GG10 spread from RBS Securities
3
may not be an actual constituent of the CMBX series it is compared to. For example, a frequently
quoted basis in the market is between the AAA CMBX spread and the spread on the A4 bonds
from Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities Corp. II, 2007-GG10. We term this basis the GG10 basis
hereafter, and is charted in Figure 2. Despite the fact that this GG10 bond is not a constituent in
any series of the CMBX, features such as its liquidity and vintage designate it as a benchmark bond
in the CMBS market. Regardless of how the CMBX-Cash basis is defined, whether it be against
another index of cash spreads or a single-name cash spread, three observations are immediate: (1)
the basis is volatile, (2) the basis is negative, and (3) the basis is persistent.
If cash and synthetic spreads diverge significantly, leading to a non-zero basis, an arbitrage
opportunity seems apparent. Recall that the CDS basis is calculated as follows:
Basis = CDS Spread− Cash Spread
where a positive basis suggests an arbitrage profit could be generated by taking a long position
in the credit of the reference entity by selling CDS protection, and selling the bonds of the entity.
Conversely, a negative basis can be capitalized upon by taking a long position in the entity’s bonds
and buying credit protection through the CDS market. By taking opposite positions in the credit
of the entity, the synthetic and cash spreads should converge to some degree.
2.2 Explaining the Basis
The arbitrage relationship between CDS and cash spreads has been discussed in the literature by
Duffie (1999) and Hull and White (2000). The motivation behind our study is to examine how
the CMBX payment structure and assumptions made with respect to the notional schedules of the
underlying loans may distort the basis. We make no attempt to test whether or not the arbitrage
relationship between the CMBX and CMBS spreads hold. However, given the observations in
Figure 1 and 2, a brief discussion of the commonly cited reasons for the existence of the basis is
worthwhile. O’Kane and McAdie (2001) discuss potential explanations for the basis in the general
cash and CDS market. We briefly review explanations most applicable in the CMBX-Cash market:
1. Funding: The cost of taking a position in the cash market may be higher than doing so in the
synthetic market. Whereas a position in CDS secures funding costs at the US dollar London
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), most investors in the cash market must fund at a rate higher
than Libor. This may induce investors to accept a lower spread in the CDS market than in
the cash market, pushing down the CDS basis.
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2. Counterparty Risk: Unlike a cash bond, CDS trade over-the-counter with a counterparty
taking the opposing position. This counterparty introduces a new type of risk into the trans-
action, which may push the buyer of protection (BoP) to pay a lower protection premium.
3. Accrued Premium: Under a CMBX contract the BoP must continue to pay the fixed premium
despite a credit event occurring. In the cash market, an investor who has a long position in
the CMBS cannot collect the accrued premium in the event of default. This implies that the
spread on CMBX should trade slightly narrower than the spread on the bond, decreasing the
basis.
4. Funding Risk: By assuming a position in the synthetic market, an investor can fix their
funding cost at Libor until the contract expires. An investor may accept a lower CDS spread
in exchange for the elimination of changes in funding costs, which would drive the basis
downwards.
5. Liquidity: Differences in liquidity in the cash and synthetic market may explain the deviation
in spreads. An investor may accept a lower spread in the synthetic market in exchange for
greater liquidity.
While the literature and the market may dispute the validity of the above explanations, we simply
wish to acknowledge them. Any or all of the explanations may indeed be driving the basis. However,
our motivation is to show that regardless of why it exists, the impact of assumptions and trading
conventions in the market on the basis make it a meaningless indicator of relative value between
the cash and CMBX market.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Our analysis focuses on the on-the-run CMBX Series 5. Both CMBX spreads and cash spreads
cover the period between May 22, 2008 and July 15, 2009. CMBX spreads and the cash spread
indices were collected from Barclays Capital. While single-name CMBS spreads for the individual
constituents of the CMBX series are ideal, the availability of the data is limited. Nonetheless, we
examine the GG10 basis quoted in the market to provide insight on how the market views the
CMBX-Cash basis. The quoted GG10 spread is provided by RBS Securities.
5
The projected notional schedules for each index were obtained from Intex, a leading provider
of structured fixed-income cash flow models.3 Our analysis considers three alternate loss scenarios
for the constituent CMBS: base/no default (notional balance of the underlying declines purely due
to amortization), moderate and a severe default scenario. The constant default rate (CDR) and
cumulative default rate assumed in the moderate default scenario is shown in Figure 6, while the
severe default scenario loss curve is shown in Figure 7.
US dollar Libor rates are collected from Thomson ONE for the following maturities: overnight,
1-week, 2-week, and 1 to 12-months. US dollar swap rates were collected from Bloomberg, for ma-
turities of 2 to 12 years, 15, 20, 25 and 30 years. The US dollar Libor-Swap curve was bootstrapped
for each day in the sample period to obtain the appropriate risk-free discount factors.
3.2 Methodology
The change in CMBX quoting convention to price has made the value of the upfront payment
visible in the market.4 However, we compute the upfront payment to verify that our calculated
risky discount factors and implied CMBX spreads are consistent with the upfront payment quoted
in the market.
For each index and trade date in our sample period, we determine the value of the upfront
payment to be exchanged between the Buyer of Protection (BoP) and the Seller of Protection
(SoP) using the market convention. Recall that the upfront payment is the net present value of the
fixed and floating payments over the life of the CMBX contract, adjusted for any fixed premium
accrued from the last payment date:
upfrontt,mkt =
N∑
i=1
pmti,mkt − accpremt, (1)
where the subscripts t and mkt denote the trade date and market quoting convention.
The upfront payment is simply the product of the spread differential and notional balance at
the start of the calculation period, adjusted using the actual/360 accrual convention and discounted
using the the appropriate risk-free discount factor and probability of survival:
pmti,mkt =
tradedt − fixed
10000
× τi × notionali−1,mkt × zi × si, (2)
3 Intex provides cashflow models for a range of structured finance products, including CMBS deals. Intex determines
notional schedules for the CMBX tranches based on given performance assumptions for the underlying collateral
in the index. The performance assumptions for the underlying loans were provided from RBS Securities.
4 See Appendix C.2 for details on the relationship between the quoted price and upfront payment.
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where tradedt is the traded spread of the index, fixed is the fixed coupon rate, τi is the accrual
period between i and i − 1, notionali−1,mkt is the notional balance of the reference obligations at
the start of the accrual period, zi is the risk-free discount factor for the t = 0 to ti period, and si is
the survival probability from t = 0 to ti. We apply the same methodology as Markit to calculate
the survival probability at each payment date i:
s0 = 1 (3)
s1 =
s0(1− δ)
tradedt × τi + 1− δ
(4)
sn =
(1− δ)
n−1∑
i=1
zi(si−1 − si)− tradedt
n−1∑
i=1
zisiτi + znsn−1(1 + δ)
zn(τntradedt + 1− δ)
(5)
where the recovery rate δ = 0. Using the appropriate adjusted notional schedule for each default
scenario: base, moderate and severe; we perform a similar calculation as in equation (2). However,
the projected notional schedules of the reference obligations for the three default scenarios are
substituted for notionali−1,mkt and risk-free discount factors are applied to solve for a new scenario-
specific spread that equates the stream of net fixed and floating payments to the upfront payment
calculated in equation (1):
upfrontt,mkt = upfrontt,b =
B∑
i=1
pmti,b − accpremt (6)
= upfrontt,m =
M∑
i=1
pmti,m − accpremt (7)
= upfrontt,s =
S∑
i=1
pmti,s − accpremt (8)
where the subscripts b,m,s denote the upfront payment under the base, moderate and severe default
scenarios, respectively, and B, M and S represent the number of payment dates under each scenario.5
5 The number of payments under each default scenario will vary as writedowns and amortization determine the rate
at which the notional balance approaches zero. Additionally, the number of payments across rating categories will
also vary for the same default scenario due to the subordination structure of the reference obligations. For example,
the moderate default scenario for the AJ tranche will have 105 payments following the trade date, while the BBB
tranche will have 136 payments following the trade date.
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We solve for the scenario-specific spread as follows:
upfrontt,mkt + accpremt =
B∑
i=1
(
spreadt,b − fixed
10000
×
actual
360
× notionali−1,b × zi
)
(9)
=
M∑
i=1
(
spreadt,m − fixed
10000
×
actual
360
× notionali−1,m × zi
)
(10)
=
S∑
i=1
(
spreadt,s − fixed
10000
×
actual
360
× notionali−1,s × zi
)
(11)
where zi is the risk-free discount factor for payment date i. The discount factor for each payment
date is extracted from the curve using linear interpolation.
By computing the spread under various default scenarios, we can determine an alternate spread
that each index would trade at if the market priced the index according to its alternate notional
schedule, rather than the notional schedule implied by the market convention for quoting CMBX
spreads. We do not assume that any of the three default scenarios considered represents the true
degree of default risk in the underlying CMBS. Rather, we select these three scenarios to illustrate
that for the same given CMBX contract value, the spread can vary considerably as the assumed
timing, speed and total expected losses in the underlying CMBS are varied.
4 Results
4.1 Traded Spreads Relative to Scenario-Specific Spreads
While the spreads have been recomputed for all seven ratings categories of the CMBX Series 5, we
limit our discussion to two ratings tranches (AAA and BBB) for the sake of brevity. However, the
results for the remaining five tranches are provided in the appendix.
4.1.1 CMBX.NA.AAA.5
The recomputed spreads for the AAA tranche are shown in Figure 8. The recomputed spread shows
little variation across the three default scenarios under consideration. Even under a scenario that
assumes significant cumulative losses in the underlying CMBS by the balloon date, the subordina-
tion structure keeps the AAA spread tightly bound to the spread under the no default scenario.6
6 The balloon date is the date at which a large, remaining lump sum of the loan must be repaid to the CMBS
investor.
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Moreover, we observe that the spread under severe default is lower than the spread under no de-
fault. As writedowns occur, AAA CMBS have the highest priority in recovering payment—therefore
under a severe default scenario, default-induced prepayments are pushing down the spread.7 An
important observation from Figure 8 is the relationship between size of the gap between the traded
and alternate spreads, and the level of the traded spread. As the traded spread trends further away
from the fixed rate of the index, the differential between the traded spread and the recomputed
spreads grows. Leading up to November 2008, the AAA spread traded below 250 bps and the
differential remained below 50 bps. However, the deviation between the recomputed spreads and
the traded spread peaks sharply during November 2008. Moreover, this gap is at its widest on
the same date (November 20, 2008) that the traded spread is at its highest level of 848 bps. This
relationship holds true in terms of minimizing the gap between the traded spread and recomputed
base spread. The AAA traded spread reached a low of 100 bps on June 17, 2008, the date on which
the gap is minimized.
Figures 16 and 15 illustrate the notional schedule implied under the market convention for
the highest and lowest spread of the AAA-rated index. The alternate notional schedules under
the three default scenarios show that the AAA-rated index has zero term risk, while the notional
schedule implied by the trading mechanics of the CMBX indicates otherwise. The implied notional
schedule on November 20, 2008 suggests significant losses before the balloon date. Conversely, the
implied notional schedule on June 17, 2008 resembles the alternate schedules more closely but still
indicates some term risk. Each figure shows that for the same upfront payment, the spread can
trade at various levels depending on the assumed rate of decline in the notional schedule.
4.1.2 CMBX.NA.BBB.5
Figure 12 presents the traded spread relative to the recomputed spreads of our three default sce-
narios. The sudden divergence between the traded spread and recomputed spreads coincides with
the same divergence point of the AAA-rated index, leading into November 2008. However, unlike
Figure 8, the spreads under each scenario are easily distinguished from each other. Prior to Novem-
ber 2008, the spread under the severe default scenario trades tightly to the market spread of the
7 This effect of credit enhancement can also be observed in the AJ CMBX index, where the spread under no default
exceeds the spread under severe default. See Figures 17 and 18 for a spread comparison. The AAA-rated CMBX
index exhibits minimal prepayment convexity relative to the AJ-rated CMBX index, which is more affected by
default-induced prepayment.
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index.
Figures 23 and 24 show the implied notional schedule for the BBB index on the date of the
index’s minimum and maximum spread. We first consider the notional schedules on May 22 2008,
the lowest traded spread in the trading history of CMBX.NA.BBB.5. Under the moderate default
scenario, losses begin to impact the index between six and seven years following the trade date. If
the index were to trade under this alternate notional schedule, the justified spread would be 973
bps, 200 bps lower than the traded spread on that date. Conversely, the severe default scenario
projects losses beginning into year three. By year four, the remaining notional balance under severe
default falls beneath the notional balance implied by the traded spread. Under this scenario, the
severe spread is higher than the traded spread.
Next we consider the market implied notional on April 14 2009. The traded spread on this
date reached over 6400 bps, implying that the notional schedule has already burned off 50% of
its beginning balance by the first year of the CMBX contract. In comparison, the severe default
scenario burns off completely before the implied schedule, yet its justified spread of 2631 bps is less
than half the traded spread.
4.2 Spread Duration
We next examine the PV01 of each index to observe how the value of the CMBX contract changes
for a 1 bp change in traded spread. We adopt Markit’s methodology of calculating the PV01:
1. Add 0.5 bps to the traded spread to obtain the new upfront payment: upfront+∆0.5
2. Subtract 0.5 bps from the traded spread to obtain the new upfront payment: upfront
−∆0.5
3. The PV01 is simply: PV01= upfront+∆0.5 − upfront−∆0.5
As expected, the relative PV01s of the CMBX indices are consistent with their respective credit
quality. As shown in Figure 29, the PV01 of the AAA index is the highest of the series, while the BB
index is the lowest. The sharp movements in the level of the PV01 over the sample period coincide
with the same movements in the traded spread of the index. On average over the sample period,
an increase or decrease of 1 bp to the traded spread impacts the AAA price by 0.054%. The lowest
credit-quality index, BB, has been the least sensitive to basis point changes in the spread, with an
average PV01 of 0.006%. This range is driven by the disparate spread levels of each index—as an
increase of 1 bp to the BB CMBX spread is a considerably smaller fraction of the traded level than
it is for the AAA CBMX spread.
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However, the convex relationship between the change in the upfront payment and the change
in the traded spread is important to note. Tables 2 to 4 show the change in the upfront payment
across all indices for small changes in spread, for three trade dates: 22 May 2008, 20 November 2008
and 15 July 2009. As expected, decreasing(increasing) the spread results in a(n) decrease(increase)
in the upfront payment for all indices. However, the magnitude of the decrease in the upfront
payment exceeds the magnitude of the increase for the same change in spread. Recalling that the
price of the CMBX index is the par value minus the upfront payment (adjusted for any accrued
premium), the price of the index is more sensitive to spreads tightening than widening.
4.3 Interest Rate Sensitivity
For each index and date in our sample period, we allow a ±25 bps shift in the Libor-Swap curve
to determine how the spread varies as the upfront payment is held constant. For each given trade
date, the upfront payment is calculated based upon the actual Libor-Swap curve and traded spread
for that index. We then assume a parallel 25 bps shift in the Libor-Swap curve. Under each of
the three default scenarios, we solve for the spread that keeps the upfront payment constant after
adjusting the risk-free discount factors. This methodology is also applied to determine the implied
spread based on the market’s assumed notional schedule. To solve for this implied spread, the
survival probabilities are recalculated as well as the risk-free discount factors.
Figures 30 to 36 show the change in the implied deal spread in response to parallel yield curve
shifts of 25 bps. The change in the implied deal spread is calculated under four different notional
schedules: the assumed notional in the market and our three default scenarios. This change in
spread is relative to the implied spread under the actual Libor-Swap curve, for the same notional
schedule and is calculated as follows:
∆Spreadi,+∆25 = Spreadi,+∆25 − Spreadi,actual (12)
∆Spreadi,−∆25 = Spreadi,−∆25 − Spreadi,actual (13)
where i denotes the assumed notional schedule of the index (market, base, moderate, and severe).
The sensitivity of the implied CMBX index spread to shifts in the yield curve is inversely related
to the index’s level of subordination. As shown in Figure 36, the CMBX index of the lowest credit
quality is the most sensitive to shifts in the yield curve. The implied spread of the BB-rated
CMBX index increases and decreases by as much as 400 bps in response to a 25 bps increase and
decrease, respectively. Conversely, the implied deal spread of the AAA-rated CMBX index is the
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least sensitive to shifts in the yield curve, with the spread never increasing or decreasing by more
than 10 bps during the sample period. However, as discussed in Section 6.3, the price impact of
these changes in spread differ across indices. Thus, while the BB-rated CMBX spread is more
sensitive to yield curve shifts, the price impact of this change in spread is less than the price impact
for the AAA-rated CMBX index.
The key observation in Figures 30 to 36 is that the market convention of calculating the upfront
payment based on a notional schedule that declines at a rate determined by the traded spread
translates into extreme sensitivity to interest rates. The implied spreads under alternate notional
schedules are considerably less sensitive to yield curve shifts—the change in the implied spread
never exceeds the size of the yield curve shift. The degree of distortion between the alternate
notional schedules and the market implied notional schedule is amplified as the credit quality of
the index declines.
While Markit explains its decision to change CMBX trading from spread to price as an effort
to increase the transparency of the upfront payment, the wide spreads and high sensitivity to
interest rate movements can also account for this change in convention. Since the change in trading
convention is relatively recent, whether or not this has reduced volatility in the CMBX and CMBS
market is difficult to evaluate.
4.4 Revisiting the Basis
Based upon the three default scenarios considered, the AAA-rated CMBX index has negligible term
default risk. Yet despite the known credit enhancement of the index, the traded spread indicates
market expectations of losses in the reference obligations. In addition to the distortions caused by
the trading mechanics of the index, the wide spread may suggest that market participants are pricing
more than pure default risk of the constituent CMBS. The risk that the underlying collateral may
be unable to refinance and pay the principal at the balloon date could be a potential explanation
for wide AAA spreads. The AAA spread began its sharp ascension to its November 20, 2008 peak
in early November 2008, coinciding with the period during which the Treasury-Eurodollar (TED)
spread also peaked. Assuming the TED spread accurately represents the strain in credit markets,
the spread on AAA CMBX was valuing the refinancing risk of the underlying obligations.
Since lower-rated tranches do not have the obvious credit enhancement of the AAA index, it
is more difficult to explain the sheer magnitude of the CMBX-Cash basis and gap between the
traded spread and scenario-specific spreads. Moreover, the notional schedules of the three default
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scenarios considered are not necessarily the appropriate trajectory for writedowns in the underlying.
However, as we observe in Figure 23, the spread is driven by not only how soon writedowns take
place, but the rate at which they occur once they do. While the notional schedule implied by the
market may assume immediate writedowns, the traded spread may be less than a spread implied
by a notional schedule where writedowns are deferred, but occurring at higher rate.
Using the implied spreads under the alternate notional schedules, we recompute the basis for
AAA and BBB CMBX. Figures 37 and 38 show the basis as observed in the market, compared to
alternate measures of the basis. It is important to note that the cash spread is the index of cash
spreads from Barclays Capital, shown in Figure 5. The spreads for BBB CMBS appear stale with
little movement over our sample period, which may be a reflection of low trading in subordinate
tranches or simply data quality issues specific to Barclays Capital.
However, given that the synthetic side of the basis has been adjusted for alternate notional
schedules, the cash side may no longer be comparable to our alternate CMBX spreads. Since the
Barclays Capital cash spreads are an index with an unknown composition and notional schedule, no
adjustment is made to the cash side of this basis measure. However, we use the GG10 basis measure
to explore the effect of adjusting both components of the basis. By adjusting both the synthetic
and cash components, we may get a CMBX-Cash basis that is a better indicator of relative value
in the two markets. We implement this adjustment for a single date (July 22 2009), rather than
our full sample to simply illustrate how the basis can vary with the alternate notional schedule
assumed. The traded spread for GG10 A4 is based on a 0 CPY, 0 CDR notional schedule that
assumes the loan pays down as expected under the terms of the contract. This traded spread is
equivalent to the base spread for the GG10 A4 bond. However, using this 0 CPY, 0 CDR schedule,
we apply the moderate and severe default scenarios to calculate alternate spreads. The alternate
spreads for GG10 A4 are then compared to our alternate AAA CBMX spreads to see how the basis
changes under these assumptions.
The results are shown in Table 5. The first row shows that on July 22, 2009, the observed basis
in the market—using the spreads that are implied by the synthetic and cash market’s respective
pricing convention—is nearly -250 bps. However, as we adjust the synthetic and cash notional
schedules to reflect our three alternate default scenarios, we see that the adjusted basis becomes
wider as the speed and timing of defaults intensifies. Interestingly, the AAA CMBX spreads across
our alternate notional schedules are approximately equal, while the GG10 spread is more sensitive
to changes in the default schedule. Both Figure 37 and Table 5 show that the CMBX-Cash basis
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can take on any possible value once you impose any alternate notional schedule.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
The introduction of the CMBX has provided the market with an efficient instrument to synthetically
gain or hedge exposure to the CMBS market, across a range of credit ratings. However, the
quotation convention of the index has distorted the perceived level of default risk in the commercial
real estate market—this distortion is exacerbated as the deviation between the traded spread and
fixed premium grows larger. By calculating new implied spreads under alternate notional schedules
of the constituent CMBS, we find that following November 2008 the deal spreads on the indices
trade far wider than spreads under a scenario of severe default. The implications of this finding
suggest that the true, or justified, CMBX-Cash basis is in fact more negative than observed in the
market. However, the impact of synthetic spreads on the cash market is unknown. While recent
CMBS issuance has been low, secondary trading has remained robust. If synthetic spreads are
artificially wide due to trading mechanics, and these spreads in turn lead the cash market, then
both components of the CMBX-Cash basis are distorted.
Arbitrageurs looking to profit from a perceived mispricing between the CMBX-Cash market
should be aware that this distortion may limit the ability of the basis to move towards its equilibrium
relationship. Moreover, an observed negative or positive basis is not a clear indication of relative
mispricing between the two markets. The observed basis as shown in Figures 1 and 2, is calculated
using the spreads implied under each market’s quoting convention. However, given the differences in
quoting conventions, the quoted basis in the market is not an appropriate measure of relative value
in the two markets. Additionally, amongst the CMBX dealers in the market, there may be different
conventions as to which cash spread is designated the benchmark for quoting purposes. Even after
adjusting the notional schedules for the CMBX and cash sides of the basis, its meaningfulness as an
indicator is questionable. As we have demonstrated, the spread is highly sensitive to assumptions
in how the notional balance declines, interest rates, and risks such as prepayment and extension.
As the aforementioned assumptions vary, we can push the basis to take on any value we choose.
The persistence of the basis remains a puzzle. Firstly, the ability to enforce arbitrage in the
CMBX market is made more difficult given that it references 25 names. As an arbitrageur, the
ability to find all 25 CMBS in the index is limited. The initial offering size across all 25 names is
not equal, nor is the relative trading volume. This explains the practice in the market of using the
14
single-name basis as a proxy for the true CMBX-Cash basis. Another consideration, mentioned
in Section 4.4, is the impact of extension risk. Under the market convention of quoting the basis,
we compare the CMBX spread to a single-name cash spread. However, the CMBX is essentially
a basket of CDS referencing 25 names. The impact of extension risk on the CMBX spread versus
the cash spread may be less given the effect of diversification. Returning to the example in Table
5, we observe that impact of prepayment on the cash spread is greater than the impact on the
CMBX spread.8 The limited impact of extension risk on the diversified CMBX may be pushing the
synthetic spread down, while the single-name cash spread trades wider due to greater exposure.
8 We do not know the price impact of the change in the GG10 spread. However, as discussed in Section 4.2, the
price of AAA CMBX is the most sensitive to changes in spread of the seven CMBX indices.
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A CMBX Indicative Terms
Table 1: CMBX Indicative Terms
Index Name Fixed Rate (bps)
Indices: CMBX.NA.AAA.5 35
CMBX.NA.AJ.5 98
CMBX.NA.AA.5 175
CMBX.NA.A.5 350
CMBX.NA.BBB.5 500
CMBX.NA.BBB-.5 500
CMBX.NA.BB.5 500
Notional: Amortization mirrors underlying bonds
Fixed Rate: Established 1-day prior to roll date
Floating Rate Payments: Interest Shortfall, Writedown, Principal Shortfall
Additional Fixed Payments: Floating rate payment event reimbursements
Quotations: Quoted on price (difference between the par value
and upfront payment). Upfront payment based
upon the difference between the current
traded spread and the Fixed Rate.
Physical Settlement: Does not apply
Accruals: 25th to the 25th of each month
Payments: Made on the 25th of each month
Day Count: Actual/360
Source: Markit
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B Origins of the CMBX Market
CMBS have been a prominent source of financing for the commercial real estate market over the past
twenty years. The development of the securitization market has facilitated lending by improving
liquidity and creating a secondary market for the loans. As illustrated in Figure 3, CMBS issuance
in the US has grown remarkably since 1990, peaking at $248 billion in 2007. Moreover, the growth
potential for the CMBS market remains considerable as the percentage of securitized commercial
loans represents 27% of the total commercial debt market. However, credit markets have remained
strained since mid-2007 due to the prolonged effects of the subprime residential mortgage crisis.
Consequently, CMBS issuance in 2008 and 2009 has fallen sharply. Issuance in the US totalled $22
billion in 2008, and stands at $11 billion as of July 2009.
Figure 3: US CMBS Issuance
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On March 7, 2006 the first series of the CMBX initiated trading and allowed investors to gain
or shed broad synthetic credit exposure to the CMBS market. Markit both owns and acts as the
administrator of the CMBX. On the launch date of each series of the CMBX, the series is initially
an equally-weighted basket of credit default swaps (CDS) that references 25 single-name CMBS.
The weights may vary as the CMBS underlying the index pay down at different rates. The index
does not reference the 25 entities, but rather a specific obligation for each entity. Hence, a default
by an entity in one tranche of the issue does not force default in senior tranches. Each series
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is further partitioned into indices by credit rating. Upon the initial launch of CMBX Series 1,
there were five ratings categories: AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BBB-. Since the initial Series 1 roll,
two additional ratings categories have been added to CMBX Series 2 through 5: AJ and BB.9
Approximately every six months, a new series is rolled out with 25 new constituent CMBS. As a
new series is introduced, trading in the previous series continues. There are currently five CMBX
series trading.10
Prior to April 20, 2009, the CMBX indices traded on spread. Following a dealer vote, the CMBX
trading convention switched to price in an effort to increase transparency of the upfront value of
the contract. Thus, both the CMBX spread and price are publicly available on all CMBX series
and indices. Since the CMBX indices are effectively an index of CDS referencing the obligations of
25 entities, market participants frequently compare the differential between the CMBX spread and
spread on a constituent CMBS. Many traders attempt to exploit this differential, known as “the
basis”. A non-zero basis is often interpreted as a dislocation in credit markets that can be profited
upon. However, we will examine how the market trading convention can distort the pricing of
CMBX indices—particularly as the traded spread widens significantly relative to the index’s fixed
premium.
C CMBX Trading Mechanics
We begin with a basic overview of trading in CMBX, which is structured identically to trading
in single-name CMBS CDS. Under a CMBX trade, there are two involved parties: the seller of
protection (SoP) and the buyer of protection (BoP). In the absence of a credit event, the BoP
pays the SoP the fixed rate on the contract’s notional balance. This fixed rate is also referred to
as the coupon or premium, and is established and disclosed by Markit for each rating category
one day prior to the series’ roll date following a survey from dealers in the market. The SoP
merely collects the premium and need not pay any amount to the BoP. Under this scenario, the
payments of a CMBX contract are identical to a standard corporate CDS contract. However,
once a credit event occurs, the payments exchanged under a CMBX contract no longer resemble
a corporate CDS. This is the key distinction between the “Cash and Physical Settlement” (CPS)
9 The AJ tranche (the most subordinate of the AAA tranches), was incorporated into CMBX Series 1 on January 4,
2008. CMBX Series 1 does not include a BB tranche.
10The majority of CMBX dealers voted to defer the CMBX Series 6 launch, originally planned for October 25, 2008,
due to thin CMBS issuance.
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and the “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAUG) formats, which are standardized by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Corporate CDS follow the CPS structure, while single-name
CMBS CDS and CMBX follow the PAUG format with cash settlement. Since physical settlement
does not apply, the CMBX-Cash basis is not influenced by the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option
embedded in corporate CDS contracts.11 In order to understand the how the CMBX is priced, a
discussion of the PAUG structure is required.
C.1 PAUG Settlement and the CMBX
PAUG settlement contrasts sharply with the CPS format when a credit event occurs. As sum-
marized in Table 1, three defined credit events trigger a floating payment from the SoP to the
BoP:
1. Writedown: occurs in the event of a reduction in the principal of a constituent reference
CMBS, not owing to a scheduled or unscheduled principal payment
2. Failure to pay principal: the reference CMBS fails to make the required principal payment
3. Interest shortfall: failure by the reference entity to either pay an expected interest amount,
or the actual interest amount paid is less than the expected interest amount.
The floating payment is intended to compensate the BoP for losses suffered. However, the com-
pensation payments under PAUG settlement are spread out over remaining scheduled payment
dates—as opposed to a single compensation payment that terminates the contract under corporate
CDS contracts. Moreover, the fixed rate payments made by the BoP continue. The continuing ex-
change of payments over the life of the contract better reflect the actual cashflows of the underlying
CMBS. If interest shortfalls and writedowns in a reference CMBS are reversed in a future period,
a reimbursement payment is made by the BoP to the SoP. The ongoing exchange and adjustment
of payments at scheduled dates enable the CMBX to synthetically replicate the cash flows of the
reference obligations. Since the reimbursements are not limited to one point in time, the settle-
ment method is termed “pay-as-you-go”. A credit event under PAUG settlement does not result
in termination of the contract, unlike corporate CDS under the CPS.
11For corporate CDS with physical settlement, the BoP is given delivery optionality. When a credit event occurs, the
BoP has the option to deliver some equivalent-seniority bond of the reference entity in exchange for the bond’s par
value from the SoP. Thus, there is an incentive for the BoP to search the market for the CTD bond. The impact
of the CTD option on the basis is discussed in Blanco et al. (2005).
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C.2 CMBX Pricing and Trading
Effective April 20, 2009 the CMBX indices began trading on price rather than quoted spread.
The quoted price is the difference between the par value and any required upfront payment to be
exchanged between the BoP and SoP, adjusted for any accrued premium from the last payment
date:
price per $1 par = 1−
upfront payment− accrued premium
notional
(14)
accrued premium = notional× fixed rate×
actual
360
(15)
The upfront payment reflects the change in the value of the contract as the traded spread of the
index deviates from the fixed coupon rate—it is the net present value of the contract’s expected fixed
and floating payments on the date the trade is initiated. The traded spread and fixed coupon rate
differential are applied to the notional schedule of the index that assumes no default or prepayment,
adjusted for the probability of survival.
If the traded spread of the index exceeds the fixed coupon rate, it implies that the perceived
credit risk of the reference obligations has increased since the roll date of the index. Therefore, the
BoP must make an upfront payment to the SoP to compensate the SoP for assuming this increased
default risk. Conversely, if the traded spread falls below the fixed rate of the index, the SoP must
pay the BoP since the risk of default by the reference obligations has fallen. The adjustment to the
upfront payment accounts for the premium accrued since the last fixed payment date. In the case
of an upfront payment from the BoP to the SoP, the upfront is reduced by the accrued premium.
C.3 Risk Indicator in the Commercial Mortgage Market
The CMBX indices have been constructed to allow investors to synthetically assume a long or short
position in the 25 constituent CMBS. The CMBX’s partitioning by rating category, standardized
documentation, construction transparency and pre-defined roll dates have made the indices an
appealing, liquid alternative to the underlying cash bonds. Despite active trading of CMBS in the
secondary market, thin issuance during 2008 and 2009 has led to a greater focus on the synthetic
market to assess risk in the commercial real estate market. As such, the record spreads of the
CMBX Series 5 have been interpreted by the market as a worrying indicator of default. As shown
in Figure 4, traded spreads for the current on-the-run series have widened considerably since their
initial roll date of May 22, 2008. For example, the traded spread on CMBX.NA.AAA.5 reached
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a peak of nearly 850 bps on November 20, 2008—implying market expectations of 850 bps losses
per year on the constituent CMBS. However, the credit enhancement provided by subordination in
AAA CMBS protects the investor from principal shortfalls and has historically translated to tight
spreads over swaps. Figure 5 presents historical CMBS spreads over swaps since early 2006. The
notable widening in spreads coincides with the onset of the August 2007 US residential subprime
mortgage crisis, suggesting that the commercial mortgage market is not entirely insulated from the
problems of the residential market.
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D Figures and Tables
Figure 4: On-The-Run CMBX Spreads
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Figure 5: CMBS Spreads
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Figure 6: Moderate Default
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Figure 7: Severe Default
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
16.00%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
4.00%
4.50%
5.00%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 D
e
fa
u
lt
s
C
D
R
Years (Since Securitization)
CDR
Cum Default
25
Figure 8: CMBX.NA.AAA.5 Spreads
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Figure 9: CMBX.NA.AJ.5 Spreads
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Figure 10: CMBX.NA.AA.5 Spreads
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Figure 11: CMBX.NA.A.5 Spreads
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Figure 12: CMBX.NA.BBB.5 Spreads
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Figure 13: CMBX.NA.BBB-.5 Spreads
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Figure 14: CMBX.NA.BB.5 Spreads
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Figure 15: AAA Notional Schedule: 17 June 2008
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Figure 16: AAA Notional Schedule: 20 November 2008
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Figure 17: AJ Notional Schedule: 17 June 2008
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Figure 18: AJ Notional Schedule: 15 April 2009
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Figure 19: AA Notional Schedule: 22 May 2008
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Figure 20: AA Notional Schedule: 20 April 2009
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Figure 21: A Notional Schedule: 22 May 2008
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Figure 22: A Notional Schedule: 20 April 2009
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Figure 23: BBB Notional Schedule: 22 May 2008
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Figure 24: BBB Notional Schedule: 14 April 2009
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Figure 25: BBB- Notional Schedule: 22 May 2008
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Figure 26: BBB- Notional Schedule: 20 April 2008
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Figure 27: BB Notional Schedule: 17 Jun 2008
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Figure 28: BB Notional Schedule: 20 April 2009
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Figure 29: Price Value of a Basis Point
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Table 2: Change in Upfront Payment: 22 May 2008
Spread Change -10 bps -5 bps +5 bps +10 bps
AAA -$652,917 -$325,831 $324,583 $647,921
AJ -$575,140 -$287,012 $285,901 $570,695
AA -$532,141 -$265,561 $264,546 $528,080
A -$485,920 -$242,509 $241,610 $482,324
BBB -$360,224 -$179,788 $179,142 $357,641
BBB- -$267,264 -$133,399 $132,936 $265,410
BB -$176,680 -$88,193 $87,902 $175,513
Table 3: Change in Upfront Payment: 20 November 2008
Spread Change -10 bps -5 bps +5 bps +10 bps
AAA -$384,357 -$191,811 $191,078 $381,426
AJ -$169,350 -$84,519 $84,208 $168,105
AA -$130,417 -$65,094 $64,864 $129,500
A -$109,528 -$54,675 $54,497 $108,816
BBB -$67,074 -$33,489 $33,395 $66,696
BBB- -$59,907 -$29,912 $29,830 $59,579
BB -$35,486 -$17,722 $17,681 $35,320
Table 4: Change in Upfront Payment: 15 July 2009
Spread Change -10 bps -5 bps +5 bps +10 bps
AAA -$518,648 -$258,826 $257,834 $514,680
AJ -$212,628 -$106,117 $105,726 $211,062
AA -$89,463 -$44,657 $44,509 $88,872
A -$55,240 -$27,581 $27,503 $54,929
BBB -$29,253 -$14,611 $14,579 $29,127
BBB- -$25,200 -$12,587 $12,562 $25,098
BB -$7,094 -$3,545 $3,541 $7,078
Note: Change in the upfront payment is based on $100 million notional
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Figure 30: CMBX.NA.AAA.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Figure 31: CMBX.NA.AJ.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Figure 32: CMBX.NA.AA.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Figure 33: CMBX.NA.A.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Figure 34: CMBX.NA.BBB.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Figure 35: CMBX.NA.BBB-.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Figure 36: CMBX.NA.BB.5: Change in Spread for ±25 bps Yield Curve Shift
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Table 5: CMBX.NA.AAA.5 versus GSMS 2007-GG10 A4
CMBX.NA.AAA.5 GG10 A4 Basis
Traded Spread 388.36 637.30 -248.94
Base Spread 339.92 637.30 -297.38
Moderate Spread 339.37 642.90 -303.53
Severe Spread 338.66 656.70 -318.04
Notes: Spreads as on July 22 2009
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Figure 37: Revisiting the AAA Basis
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Figure 38: Revisiting the BBB Basis
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